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Economic theory and global division of labor. Myths and 
paradoxes 
di Oreste Ventrone1 
 
 
 
Abstract 
Despite substantial differences of opinion on the origins and details of the process, 
few scholars, these days, would deny that we live today in a global age. Many could 
also agree that the theoretical and methodological framework of global analyses of the 
present world is still, predominantly, that elaborated ca. two centuries ago by the likes 
of Smith, Ricardo and List. Given the enduring relevance of these theories, testified by 
the works of scholars of any background, it is maybe still worth to inquire on the 
adequacy of these contributions for the identification and interpretation of current 
processes and, of the dynamics through which one prevails on the others in a 
determinate space-time. 
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Despite substantial differences of opinion on the origins and details of the 
process, few scholars, these days, would deny that we live today in a global age. 
Many could also agree that the theoretical and methodological framework of 
global analyses of the present world is still, predominantly, that elaborated ca. 
two centuries ago by the likes of Smith, Ricardo and List. Given the enduring 
relevance of these theories, testified by the works of scholars of any background, 
it is maybe still worth to inquire on the adequacy of these contributions for the 
identification and interpretation of current processes and, of the dynamics 
through which one prevails on the others in a determinate space-time. 
 
 
1. The enduring charm of the fetishism of ideas 
 
Ten years ago, Ha-Joon Chang's successful book Kicking Away the Ladder 
(2002) offered a tribute to Friederich List's National System of Political Economy 
(1909), one the first accomplished systematizations of a development strategy for 
late comers. In his book, List criticizes Adam Smith's argument in favour of free 
trade polemically defining it 'cosmopolitical', in that it pretends to be valid for 
any country at any stage of development. In his reading of the Wealth of Nations, 
List re-examines the process of paradigm construction and emphasizes how the 
British, in order to advance their interests in the world division of labor, have 
imposed, through Smith, the idea of 'free trade' (cosmopolitism) while the vast 
majority of the late comers need an intermediate phase of 'protection' to allow for 
the competitive development of their activities to take place. 
This attitude towards development and competitive integration in the world 
market, examined by List as an historical constant in the development of every 
core country, is identified not only as the economic behavior of the French 
starting from Colbert, but also as a basic guideline starting from the Venetians 
and the Dutch to end with the British, which have made of it the inherent 
principle of their success. Hence, the free-trade doctrine, displayed by Britain in 
the phase of its primacy on the world markets, serves essentially the interests of 
the core countries, while, at the same time, harms all the others (Lentini, 2003, p. 
177).  
Indeed, the title of Chang's book, devoted to a defence of the 'developmental 
state', draws its title from a famous passage of List's magnum opus:  
 
It is a very common clever device that when anyone has attained the summit of greatness, he 
kicks away the ladder by which he has climbed up, in order to deprive others of the means of 
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climbing up after him. In this lies the secret of the cosmopolitical doctrine of Adam Smith, and 
of the cosmopolitical tendencies of his great contemporary William Pitt, and of all his 
successors in the British Government administrations. Any nation which by means of protective 
duties and restrictions on navigation has raised her manufacturing power and her navigation to 
such a degree of development that no other nation can sustain free competition with her, can do 
nothing wiser than to throw away these ladders of her greatness, to preach to other nations the 
benefits of free trade, and to declare in penitent tones that she has hitherto wandered in the paths 
of error, and has now for the first time succeeded in discovering the truth (List, 1909, pp. 295-
296). 
 
Despite the rigor of the critiques to free trade and their solid grounding in 
history, confirmed time after time by the experiences of the totality of the 
countries that have achieved strong economic growth in the history of the world 
economy, the debate on free trade retains its salience; and this is testified by the 
very success of Chang's book. 
Indeed, Smith's argument, discredited by history and, well before List, by the 
works of Adam Muller in Germany, Jean-Antoine Chaptal and Charles Dupin in 
France, and Alexander Hamilton in the US (probably the first to outline the 
'infant industry' argument), still constitutes the core of mainstream economic 
orthodoxy and its cosmopolitism resonates in the bold statements of its current 
priests. 
Larry Summers, former economic aid to president Obama, when chief 
economist of the World Bank in 1991, stated in an interview: 
 
What can the West do to drive this process of reform [in Russia] forward? Number one: it 
can spread the truth. The laws of economics, it's often forgotten, are like the laws of 
engineering. There is only one set of laws and they work everywhere. One of the things I've 
learned in my short time at the World Bank is that whenever anybody says, 'But economics 
works differently here', they're about to say something dumb (Cited in George e Sabelli, 1994, 
p. 106). 
 
What makes free trade doctrine at least superficially plausible is a sort of 
synoptic illusion. The fact that the countries who are more liberal are also the 
most developed, at least in terms of economic growth, is a coexistence or 
correlation of factors that can easily tempt somebody in turning it into causal 
determination, inverting the historical nexus between growth and openness and 
asserting that is openness that determines growth and not the other way around. 
Anyway, at this point, what appears to us amazing by itself is the persisting 
relevance of a debate reiterated innumerable times, over more than two centuries, 
in substantially similar terms. Even more striking, is the continuing success of 
the free market/free trade doctrine in establishing itself as orthodoxy over 
historically better grounded and theoretically tighter opponents. 
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Not infrequently, theories are treated like lenses through which to see reality. 
They are often confronted between themselves, in a doxographical fashion, in 
terms of complexity, internal coherence, amount and significance of the factors 
they leave out or unexplained. So, the ideas of authors from the most disparate 
spatiotemporal dimensions are put against each other as they had a power in 
themselves regardless of the social relations in which these very theories 
emerged, what interests they served and whose vision they carried. So the 
theoretical debate looks essentially as a struggle between virtual realities wishing 
to become the "real virtuality", ie. the virtual reality that succeeds in becoming 
the official representation of reality. 
Maybe the power of ideas is quite overvalued. Especially when they pretend to 
offer a faithful representation of "reality". As in the fetishism of commodities, 
where commodities appear to enter in social relationships by themselves instead 
of mediating the relationship between human labours, the apparent social 
relationship between theories hides the underlying social relationships and the 
inevitably unequal powers involved. Unsurprisingly, Marx associated his concept 
of commodity fetishism with the dynamics of the religious world, the most 
ancient form of idea fetishism. 
 
There it is a definite social relation between men, that assumes, in their eyes, the fantastic 
form of a relation between things. In order, therefore, to find an analogy, we must have recourse 
to the mist-enveloped regions of the religious world. In that world the productions of the human 
brain appear as independent beings endowed with life, and entering into relation both with one 
another and the human race. So it is in the world of commodities with the products of men’s 
hands. This I call the Fetishism which attaches itself to the products of labour, so soon as they 
are produced as commodities, and which is therefore inseparable from the production of 
commodities (Marx, 2007, p. 83). 
 
So, we should maybe dedicate more attention to the historical conditions of 
the production of social knowledge, even more than to the theories themselves, 
and inquire on the social formations of which they are expression and whose 
powers and interests they serve. This in order to unveil the lawyers behind the 
"laws", and their ideology. 
 
 
2. (Affectively) Kicking away Chang 
 
In his well documented and tightly argumented book, Chang does a 
meritorious job, defending a position that goes against the mainstream and 
recalling often neglected authors like List. However, like in Chang's case, when 
we call into question theories from the distant past, we usually do so in order to 
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sustain and nobilitate our arguments, which often refer to a spatiotemporally 
different situation. This operation usually requires a certain degree of adaptation, 
which can range from simple transposition to outright ideological manipulation. 
Classical examples of this are the frequent references to Ricardo's comparative 
advantages in order to support free trade, which usually fail to acknowledge the 
fact that the author conceived this mechanism as functioning only in absence of 
capital and labour mobility. Indeed, if one acknowledged this condition, 
Ricardo's argument would be much more difficult to apply, for instance, to the 
current situation of international trade. 
The aspect of List's work that Chang fails to acknowledge is, first of all, that 
List produced his theory in and for a very different world. Far from being the 
fully nationalized world of today, the world the first half of the Nineteen century 
can be considered, more than an interstate system, an interimperial system, where 
imperialism was usually considered, implicitly or explicitly, as a constitutive part 
of the 'development' process.  
Secondly, even if he recognizes that industrial policy, in some cases, can 
neither be sufficient, nor necessary, for the development process, Chang treats 
protectionism and industrial policy as a strategy that any country can adopt, and, 
what is more important, in a purely theoretical stance, as it could be adopted by 
all countries at the same time without affecting each other's welfare. On this, 
Chang's argument oversees a crucial aspect of List's theory. The latter implied, at 
least implicitly, a conception of unequal exchange. In fact, the whole argument 
about protectionism and industrial policy is based, not just in List's case, on the 
assumption that in the trade between countries producing manufactures and 
countries producing raw materials, the first reap most of the economic benefits, 
and this is the very reason why developing countries should adopt industrial 
policies directed towards the promotion of high value added sectors. The 
problem is, banally, that if all countries were protectionist at the same time, 
world trade would collapse, with the consequences seen in the 30s of last 
century. Moreover, if all countries became producers of high value added 
commodities, there would be no high value added commodities. Hence, in 
Braudelian terms, producers would step down from the capitalist sphere, where 
the anti-market (contre-marché) rules in the form of monopoly, and they would 
find themselves in the market sphere, where C-M-C, i.e. the exchange of 
equivalent values, would finally rule. 
 
 
  
 8 
3. Young protectionists grow liberal 
 
Beyond the more or less instrumental claims of those who recall him, List's 
arguments were more complex and articulated. His vision was different from 
Smith's more in the means than in the ends. Essentially, he was deeply aware that 
Germany had to promote a nationally integrated political economy, develop an 
industrial policy and be protectionist in order to be able to compete with England 
on the same ground and eventually impose its own free trade to others. But, at 
the same time, the field of the competition had to remain limited. For the system 
to stay afloat there had to be a part of the world permanently confined to the 
production of raw materials and low value-added commodities, which he called 
the "tropical region", which was meant to stay under the tutorship of european 
powers according to a climatic determinist view of human development. 
 
The countries of the world most favoured by nature, with regard to both national and 
international division of labour, are evidently those whose soil brings forth the most common 
necessaries of life of the best quality and in the largest quantity, and whose climate is most 
conducive to bodily and mental exertion, and these are the countries of the temperate zone; for 
in these countries the manufacturing power especially prospers, by means of which the nation 
not merely attains to the highest degree of mental and social development and of political 
power, but is also enabled to make the countries of tropical climates and of inferior civilisation 
tributary in a certain measure to itself. The countries of the temperate zone therefore are above 
all others called upon to bring their own national division of labour to the highest perfection, 
and to use the international division of labour for their enrichment (List, 1909, p.131). 
 
As Shafaeddin notes, List recommended selected, rather than across-the-
board, protection of infant industries and that he was against neither international 
trade nor export expansion. In fact, he stressed the importance of trade and 
envisaged free trade as an "ultimate aim of all nations"; he regarded 
protectionism as instrumental to the achievement of productive power, massive 
export expansion and, ultimately, free trade (Shafaeddin, 2000, p.18). 
In fact, it is a common irony of history for the free trade argument to backfire 
on its early preachers. This is what happened in the first half of the twentieth 
century, when the United States, once reached the status of greatest commercial 
power - like Great Britain in the nineteenth, used against its former rival the same 
liberal arguments that the latter had used to establish its primacy (Ventrone, 
2004, p. 32). 
For these very reasons, just like the liberal ones, theories based on 
protectionism, despite the progressive flavor which some of them exhibit, cannot 
claim to be revolutionary, or even radical, in that they do not put into question 
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the essence of the system and its inherent exploitative nature. At best, they 
constitute elements of a strategy to shift from one to the other position of the 
relation of exploitation. 
 
 
4. A few interesting things we don't know 
 
The world has changed a lot since the ninettenth century, but not so much in 
the way we still predominantly tend to conceptualize it. While "globalization" 
progresses in its path, our conceptual and analytical tools lag behind in a national 
world. Our way of conceiving global relations is still based on a vision made up 
of the sum (algebraic in the field of economics) of the (mostly bilateral) 
interactions of theoretically infinite individual states, conceived as substantially 
comparable between themselves. 
The functioning of important objects, such as transnational corporations and 
financial firms, because of their private nature, remains substantially opaque to in 
depth analysis. For instance, these are able to distribute the cost structure of 
production across borders through intra-firm trade without entering the market, 
using the different local systems (regulation, taxes, incentives etc.) to their 
advantage and putting, in this way, states in competition between themselves. 
In the age of a global system we often lack the data to work on in a systemic 
way. In particular, data that can be used to study the global networks of 
knowledge, production, distribution and finance that shape the world as we live 
it. So we lack the harmonized disaggregate data on international financial flows 
that would allow us to map the shape of contemporary capitalism in 3D and 
finally see what it looks like: a flat world of direct/immediate connections 
(Thomas Friedman); a tripolar world of macro-regions like Europe, Americas 
and East Asia (Kenichi Ohmae, Giovanni Arrighi etc.); or a unipolar imperial 
world anchored to the enduring or declining power of the US. Moreover, the 
continuing emphasis on the state has distracted the attention from the networks 
that take shape through or above its borders. So, the study of the global élite or 
transnational capitalist class remains marginal, theoretically and empirically 
underdeveloped as the research on the galaxy of private and multilateral 
institutions, their links and their hierarchical and functional articulations. 
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5. What we should know (by now) 
 
The struggle between the Smithians and the Listians is probably doomed to 
continue. By the way, it appears every day more as a struggle between two 
opposite political rhetorics which share the same worldview. One crafted in the 
methodological nationalism of the eighteenth and nineteenth century. 
Confronted to the sophistication of current world relations, the arguments of 
the strugglers appear at least primitive. Since their first development, 
transnational corporations producing in another country can take advantage of 
that country's protectionism offsetting their competitors from outside, included 
companies of the same nationality as themselves. Moreover, in case of unilateral 
protectionism, as it is the case for China, these firms can export the commodities 
produced in situ back to their home countries putting out of market fellow local 
producers.  
Anyway, trade and industrial policy are only two important ingredients in 
development recipes. Financial flows, transfer of knowledge and technology, 
resource endowment, size, geographical and geopolitical position are a few of the 
others to take into account for a theoretically and methodologically renovated, 
systemic and, most of all, pluriversalist social knowledge. 
 
 
6. Trade, finance and the global division of labor 
 
In order to elaborate more plausible interpretations of current trends, there is 
an  impellent necessity to revise the relationship between production, trade and 
finance.  
More than a relationship between different entities (often declined as 
opposition between real and fictitious economy), production (division of labor), 
trade and finance constitute different faces of the same solid and these words are 
used as eminently imperfect Heuristic tools to describe a form whose facets we 
cannot grasp simultaneously. 
As Arrighi (1990) notes, the debate on trade – and the implied unequal 
exchange – represent an intellectual blind alley, since the single most important 
ingredient in economic development is probably capital transfer. In this he finds 
an authoritative predecessor in Marx, wich, in the section dedicated to primitive 
accumulation of the first book of Capital, already stressed this point: 
 
With the national debt arose an international credit system, which often conceals one of the 
sources of primitive accumulation in this or that people. Thus the villainies of the Venetian 
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thieving system formed one of the secret bases of the capital-wealth of Holland to whom Venice 
in her decadence lent large sums of money. So also was it with Holland and England. By the 
beginning of the 18th century the Dutch manufactures were far outstripped. Holland had ceased 
to be the nation preponderant in commerce and industry. One of its main lines of business, 
therefore, from 1701-1776, is the lending out of enormous amounts of capital, especially to its 
great rival England. The same thing is going on today between England and the United States. 
A great deal of capital, which appears today in the United States without any certificate of birth, 
was yesterday, in England, the capitalised blood of children (Marx, 2007, p. 826). 
 
In this light, the transformations in the orientation of economic policy and 
theory are to be connected to the US efforts to counteract its own decline and the 
formation of a transnational social constituency which has embraced the 
neoliberal rationale and ratified the return to financial rule through the adoption 
of inflation control as main end of economic policy . The former main goal, full 
employment, was abandoned, and world markets were pried open, to commercial 
and financial flows of any kind. Eventually Keynes' nightmare was gradually 
fulfilled as, in a world of unfettered financial flows, transnational capital was 
once again made able to put the states in competition between themselves in a 
race to the bottom in order to attract it. 
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